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Overview
After just 18 months of operation, Australia’s radical experiment in 
uncapping undergraduate university enrolments is under threat.  
According to its critics – which include the higher education 
minister and a leading vice-chancellor – it admits academically 
under-prepared students and consumes higher education funding 
that could be better used elsewhere.  
This report, Keep the caps off!, shows that the new system is 
achieving its goals. It is lifting the supply of graduates to 
Australia’s economy, increasing student choice, and improving 
access to higher education for disadvantaged groups. 
The old system of government allocating student places to 
universities was unresponsive to student demand. With 
uncapping, universities are responding to demand trends in 
science, health and engineering by providing new student places. 
The last two fields are also areas of labour market shortage. 
Across most other disciplines, university applicants’ chances of 
admission to their first-preference field of study have increased.  
With their new freedom to offer more places, universities now 
offer Commonwealth-supported students innovative new options. 
Several new online ventures have started, ensuring that Australia 
is not left behind in this global trend. Universities are collaborating 
with TAFEs to meet the needs of new students.  
Uncapping has meant that more students with lower ATARs 
(Australian Tertiary Admission Rank) are admitted to study. A 
minimum ATAR of 60 has been suggested. But degree 
completions data show that 60 is an arbitrary cut-off point. It 
would exclude the more than half of low ATAR students who 
successfully complete a qualification.  
An ATAR cut-off of 60 would hit low socioeconomic status 
university applicants hard. In 2012, 8,000 low SES applicants 
would have been rejected without further consideration. With 
eased enrolment restrictions, the number of students from low 
SES backgrounds grew by 40 per cent after years of stagnation.  
University is not for everyone. Universities have an ethical 
responsibility to advise applicants who are at high risk of not 
completing a degree. Information about completion rates should 
be much more easily available to people considering further 
study. But there is too much variation between courses and 
individual applicants for a national policy on university admission.  
There are many hidden costs in capping university enrolments. 
Student places get misallocated between disciplines, because 
universities cannot easily adjust supply to demand. New higher 
education initiatives are hard to start. People miss out on their 
preferred careers. Social mobility suffers. There would be a high 
price to pay to offset $300 million in university funding cuts.  
It would be a policy tragedy to recap university places now. It 
would make Australia’s higher education system less fair, less 
efficient, and less productive. 
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1. A demand-driven higher education funding system 
In 2009, Julia Gillard, then Education Minister, announced that 
Australia’s public universities would move to a ‘demand-driven’ 
funding system. She aimed to lift the supply of graduates to 
Australia’s economy, to increase student choice, and to improve 
access to higher education for disadvantaged groups.1 
To achieve these goals, the government substantially eased its 
regulation of student numbers. After a phased-in relaxation of 
enrolment controls, from 2012 public universities were allowed to 
take an unlimited number of bachelor-degree Commonwealth 
supported students. The only bachelor-degree course kept out of 
the demand-driven system was medicine. Postgraduate and later 
sub-bachelor degrees were also excluded.  
Demand-driven funding was a big change for universities. Since 
1974, the Commonwealth government had been allocating them 
student places. These controls were often a red tape hindrance, 
but they were also a protection. With the total number of student 
places always capped well below demand, universities were 
almost guaranteed of filling all their places. Competitive pressures 
were weak.  
Under the demand-driven system, competitive pressures have 
increased. Universities that don’t respond to student demand risk 
losing enrolments and income. But most universities have 
responded favourably to the new system. Many have substantially 
                                            
1
 DEEWR (2009a) 
increased their student numbers, and are taking advantage of 
their freedom to start new educational enterprises.  
As with any expansion in student numbers, the demand-driven 
system has called entry ‘standards’ into question. The number of 
students with a lower Australian Tertiary Admission Rank (ATAR) 
is increasing from a small base. The higher education minister, 
Senator Kim Carr, has said that his belief in “excellence” is one 
reason for re-considering growth rates in the university system.2 
The Group of Eight, a group representing the largest research 
universities, has called for a minimum ATAR requirement of 60.3 
An editorial in The Australian newspaper endorsed this proposal.4 
Mass higher education systems are also expensive. With student 
numbers increasingly rapidly, government spending on the main 
tuition subsidy program, the Commonwealth Grant Scheme, is 
expected to increase from $5 billion in 2010-11 to $7 billion in 
2016-17.5 Higher education spending cuts were announced in 
April 2013 to contain these costs. There are now proposals to re-
control student numbers instead.6 These are the major pressures 
to modify or end the demand-driven system.  
 
                                            
2
 Taylor (2013) 
3
 Mather (2013) 
4
 Australian editorial (2013) 
5
 DIICCSRTE (2013c) and predecessor publications. 
6
 Shanahan (2013) 
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2. ‘Quality’ of the student intake
Over the last 30 years, Australia has moved from an elite system 
of higher education to a mass system. In 1982, only 12 per cent of 
17 to 19 year olds were enrolled in higher education. By 2010 that 
proportion more than doubled, to 26 per cent.7 If the demand-
driven system stays in place, this proportion will continue to 
increase. Australia may achieve a government target of 40 per 
cent higher education attainment for 25 to 34 year olds by 2025.8 
As a result, universities take students who would not previously 
have gone on to higher education.  
Some people question whether lower-ATAR students should be at 
university.9 Professor Fred Hilmer, the chairman of the Group of 
Eight, suggests an ATAR minimum of 60 on the “basis of 
academic preparation and ability to benefit”.10 In the Group of 
Eight plan, excluded school leavers would have some alternative 
pathways to university.11 However, the main purpose of the 
minimum ATAR is to reduce government spending. The savings 
could then be used to avoid planned cuts to public spending on 
the remaining student places and other higher education 
                                            
7
 Norton (2013), p. 23 
8
 ABS (2013). The current proportion is 37 per cent if adult migrants are counted, 
or 30 per cent for people raised in Australia.  
9
 There are many alternative routes into university other than ATAR, including 
special admissions tests and qualifications from pathways colleges or TAFEs. 
None of these have the rankings provided by ATAR. But a policy based on the 
‘quality’ of the student intake may need to consider these applicants as well.  
10
 Mather (2013) 
11
 There are dedicated pathways colleges to university. However, these charge 
fees that are considerably higher than the student contributions paid by public 
university students.  
programs.12 How these savings could be implemented is 
discussed in chapter 7. 
2.1 What are the trends for lower-ATAR applicants? 
Between 2009 and 2012 applications from students with ATARs 
below 60 increased by 11 per cent, or just under 3,000 people. 
This compares to overall applications growth of 13 per cent.13 
Much of this growth occurred in 2012, and so possibly the 
demand-driven system is starting to generate additional 
demand.14  
Under the old funding system, demand and supply were only 
weakly linked. Potential students could apply to any course in any 
university. But the supply of places was constrained by 
government. Universities rationed places within this supply 
constraint. Typically, they used prior academic performance to 
decide who received a place. This created a market in which 
ATAR was the currency and the cut-off mark the price. Students 
with low ATARs often received no offers.  
The demand-driven system has expanded supply and driven 
down the academic price of entry. It is principally this factor (i.e. 
                                            
12
 Mather (2013) 
13
 DEEWR (2010); DIISRTE (2012) 
14
 Year 12 students are unlikely to be aware of higher education funding policy 
changes. But as entry requirements become more flexible this is likely to start 
attracting applicants who would previously have thought that they would not be 
admitted to higher education.  
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increased offers by universities) rather than significantly increased 
demand (increased applications by lower-ATAR students) that is 
driving up their numbers at university. Figure 1 shows university 
offers by the ATAR of applicants between 2009 and 2013. Below 
60 offers increased by 85 per cent as the enrolment caps were 
removed.  
Figure 1: Offers by ATAR, 2009-13 
 
Source: DIICCSRTE (2013b) and predecessor publications.  
2.2 Do lower-ATAR students complete? 
Fred Hilmer suggests an “ability to benefit” test on university 
admission. Conceptually, this is a reasonable rule of thumb. 
University entrance can be costly to students, universities and 
taxpayers. They all have an interest in ensuring that there are 
likely benefits from enrolment. Empirically, however, turning this 
test into a workable policy is difficult. Abilities are hard to 
measure, and benefits are hard to predict.  
One plausible benefit of higher education is course completion. 
Figure 2 shows outcomes by ATAR for students who commenced 
their studies in 2005. Even for students entering university with 
low ATARs, most (60 per cent) complete a degree within seven 
years of commencement. The still-enrolled students will push 
eventual completions a little higher.  
These results suggest that an ATAR of 60 lacks a strong empirical 
basis as a cut-off point for university admission. Completion rates 
are only slightly higher above than below the 60-64 ATAR band. 
ATAR is a rank rather than a score. In the middle ATARs 
underlying academic ability and preparation may not differ 
much.15 An ATAR cut-off of 60 would mean that many people who 
could successfully complete a degree would be denied that 
opportunity.  
However, figure 2 does show a clear relationship between ATAR 
and completion above 70: the higher the ATAR, the higher the 
completion rate.  
 
                                            
15
 It suggests academic ability has a normal statistical distribution: a large group 
of similar students in the middle, with longer tails of high and low ability students. 
0
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Figure 2: Completions and continuing enrolment, 2005 cohort at the 
end of 2011, by ATAR band 
 
Source: DIICCSRTE data, Grattan special request. 
As figure 2 shows, it takes many years to see the long-term 
outcomes of low-ATAR entry. It was unusually difficult to get into 
university in 2005, due to a tightening of enrolment caps. The low-
ATAR applicants admitted then might not be typical of the low-
ATAR applicants admitted now. We do not have attrition data by 
ATAR for later periods, but attrition rates from the higher 
education system as a whole are declining. As figure 3 shows, the 
rate has decreased over the last few years. Interestingly, 
institution-level attrition rates are unchanged on 19 per cent. What 
has changed is that more students are moving between 
universities after first year. This may be a benefit of the demand-
driven system. With universities more willing to accept transfers 
from students who are dissatisfied with their original choice, fewer 
of them drop out entirely.  
Figure 3: Attrition after first year, 2005-11 
 
Source: DIICCSRTE (2013d) 
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2.3 What is the relationship between ATAR and university 
marks? 
ATAR has a complicated relationship with the marks students 
receive while at university. Research to date finds that many 
students get higher marks at university than their school results 
would suggest, while many others get lower marks.16 
This point can be seen graphically in figure 4. It uses data from 
the 2007 commencing students of a large Australian university. 
Each dot presents the average mark of a student over the period 
2007-2010. We can see that average marks generally increase 
with ATAR. However, the dots show much variation around the 
average. Even among students with high ATARs, some failed on 
average. And some students who entered on low ATARs 
achieved average marks above 80 per cent.  
At the university in this analysis, students with ATARs below 70 
are only admitted via indirect routes. Although they have an 
ATAR, they use their results from a TAFE or a pathways college 
as their basis of admission. With this additional preparation, on 
average they get higher marks than students who were admitted 
directly on higher ATARs.  
School and university grades are influenced by many factors other 
than underlying academic ability, including personal 
circumstances and teaching quality. It is therefore not surprising 
that ATAR is an imperfect guide to university prospects. But these 
ATAR limitations undermine proposals to use specific ATARs as a 
general cut-off for university admission.  
                                            
16
 Norton (2013), p. 30-33 
 Figure 4: Relationship between ATAR and average weighted mark 
 
Source: Provided to Grattan Institute by an Australian university and used with permission. 
Note: Marks are weighted by the credit point value of each subject and the year level. First 
year subjects have a .5 weighting, later year subjects have a weighting of 1. 
2.4 Is university for everyone? 
While the lower-ATAR students who do enrol at university often 
complete their courses, this does not mean that university is 
always the right choice for lower-ATAR school leavers. In some 
cases their time, money and effort would be better spent on 
vocational education, looking for paid work, or other activities. 
There is no easy ATAR-based cut-off that can inform individual 
decisions.  
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As the available empirical evidence cannot give us simple rules 
we need self-regulation by students and universities. Each can 
draw on much more information than policymakers. Students 
know more about their aptitudes, interests, ambitions and 
alternatives. Universities know (or at least should know) about 
their teaching capacities and how students with various 
backgrounds have performed in the past.  
Many universities remain reluctant to take lower-ATAR students. 
This is partly for prestige reasons, but also because they are not 
always well-prepared for supporting and teaching this group.17 
Classes with mixed academic ability and preparedness can be 
difficult even for talented teachers. Only a quarter of applicants 
with ATARs below 50 received any offer in 2012.  
New technology should give universities an opportunity to fine-
tune their selection processes. Learning analytics software is one 
of the most important new developments in higher education. It 
can analyse large amounts of academic and other information 
about students to identify problems and predict success.18 It is an 
important retention tool in itself, but the starting point for this is 
identifying the high-risk students.  
The demand-driven system also creates new ethical issues for 
universities. They do not currently supply students with 
information about completion rates in their courses. Where non-
completion rates are high, this is important information for people 
deciding whether or not they should spend time and money on 
higher education. There is also a responsibility to provide 
                                            
17
 Norton, et al. (2013) 
18
 NMC (2013), p. 24-27 
adequate support so that all students have a fair chance of 
success. For example, some universities offer peer mentoring and 
additional tutorial assistance for less academic students. 
Universities must tailor the learning experience they provide to 
individual student needs. 
So far, however, applications data suggest a reasonable level of 
student self-knowledge. Most people with below-50 ATARs do not 
apply to university.19 Especially for young men, vocational 
education provides a good alternative,20 which they in fact pursue. 
Of the below-60 ATAR applicants who receive an offer, 40 per 
cent reject it. There is little research into why applicants reject 
offers. However, 15 per cent of first-year university students agree 
with the proposition that they are “marking time” while they decide 
their future.21 A university application can be just a way of keeping 
options open, rather than signalling a clear preference for higher 
education. For less academic Year 12 students, a university 
application may just be a back-up option if they do not get a job, 
an apprenticeship, or some other more preferred outcome.  
With these filtering mechanisms on both the demand and supply 
sides, low-ATAR enrolments are not massive. In 2012, 10 per 
cent of all acceptances were from applicants with an ATAR of 60 
or below.  
  
                                            
19
 DIISRTE (2012), p. 43 
20
 Karmel and Liu (2011) 
21
 James, et al. (2010), p. 19 
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3. Equity under the demand-driven system
A goal of the demand-driven system is to increase access to 
higher education for people from low socioeconomic status (SES) 
backgrounds. The aim is that low socioeconomic background 
students will make up 20 per cent of domestic undergraduate 
students by 2020.22  
The official indicators used to measure SES have many defects.23 
This chapter uses postcode data because it is the most readily 
available. A low SES student lives in the lowest 25 per cent of 
postcodes, according to Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
classifications of socioeconomic disadvantage. A high SES 
student lives in the top 25 per cent of postcodes. This definition 
misclassifies some individuals, but the data can identify broad 
trends. 
3.1 SES and ATAR 
There is a strong link between SES and ATAR, as figure 5 shows. 
High SES applicants dominate the 80-plus ATAR group. Below 
60, low SES applicants outnumber high SES applicants. An ATAR 
cut-off at 60 would inevitably hit low SES university applicants 
hard. In 2012, it would have wiped out of contention more than 30 
per cent of an already small pool of low SES applicants.  
                                            
22
 DEEWR (2009a), p. 12-14 
23
 Norton (2013), p. 29-30 
Figure 5: University applications by ATAR and SES, 2012 
 
Source: DIISRTE (2012) 
3.2 Low SES students under the demand-driven system 
The uncapping of higher education places under the demand-
driven system is critical to increasing low SES access. With their 
lower ATARs, they need the ATAR price of university entry to 
come down. Figure 6 shows that more low SES students 
commenced once enrolment caps were eased from 2008. Their 
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numbers increased by 43 per cent in this period, compared to 32 
per cent for the other SES groups.  
Figure 6: Low SES commencing domestic undergraduate students, 
2001-2012 
 
Source: DIICCSRTE (2013d) 
 
Progress towards the 20 per cent by 2020 target is slower. The 
low SES enrolment share increased from 16 per cent to 17 per 
cent between 2007 and 2012. To meet the target, low SES 
enrolments have to consistently increase more quickly than high 
SES enrolments. The way the target is defined hides increases in 
the absolute numbers of low SES students shown in figure 6. This 
increase is primarily due to the demand-driven system. Given that 
low SES students are more likely to have low ATARs, progress in 
admitting more low SES students is likely to halt if the demand-
driven system is curtailed or abolished. 
Capping student places is also likely to affect another government 
equity group, regional students. Many regional areas are 
classified as low SES. Regional student numbers also increased 
as enrolment controls were lifted.24 The minister acknowledges 
that higher education attainment in regional areas still needs a “lot 
more work”.25 
Chapter 2’s statistics on completion rates and average marks 
suggest that equity and excellence are not in as much tension as 
the minister may fear.26 Particularly if universities admit students 
carefully, equity can be achieved without sacrificing excellence.  
 
  
                                            
24
 DIICCSRTE (2013d) 
25
 Matchett (2013) 
26
 Taylor (2013) 
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4. Matching students with courses
As the name ‘demand-driven’ suggests, lifting controls on 
enrolment is designed to better match the supply of places with 
demand. A demand-driven system is intended to both enable and 
encourage universities to offer the courses students want to take.  
4.1 Previous systems of allocating student places 
In 1974 the Commonwealth Government took over the funding of 
higher education from the states. Since then it has controlled how 
student places are allocated between universities and disciplines.  
Precisely how places were allocated has varied over the years. 
From the early 1990s to 2004, universities had to deliver target 
numbers of places within a set envelope of funding. Universities 
could move student places between disciplines provided they met 
their overall enrolment target. 
Under this system universities lacked incentives to respond to 
student demand. There was no or only a small per student 
payment for taking more students than the government target 
number. Some universities nevertheless ‘over-enrolled’ (took 
more than their target number). Similarly, only some transfers of 
places between disciplines made financial sense. Universities 
saved money by shifting places from high to low cost disciplines. 
They lost it by transferring places from low to high cost disciplines.  
In this capped system, supply rather than demand steered the 
allocation of places. However, the government did not routinely 
monitor whether student places were provided in areas of greatest 
need. It mainly intervened through the allocation of new student 
places, sometimes requiring universities to put them to particular 
uses. The system therefore relied heavily on additional funding 
and proactive ministers to respond to real-world demands. It 
drifted if either was absent.  
From 2005 to 2007, the system of distributing student places 
reached its bureaucratic peak. Universities were allocated places 
by ‘funding clusters’, groups of disciplines with similar costs, as 
well as in total. Universities were fined for over-enrolling 
significantly beyond their total target number – a financial penalty 
for meeting student demand. This penalty was abolished for 2008 
and 2009, before a phase-in to the demand-driven system over 
2010 and 2011. 
As with the pre-2005 system, the main steering mechanism from 
2005 was new places. In the capped system’s final years new 
places were relatively plentiful. The government responded to 
shifts in the labour market, which coincided with shifts in student 
demand.27 However, the system retained its core structural 
weakness: its reliance on new funding and proactive ministers, 
with no institutionalised mechanism for responding to employer or 
student needs.  
The pre-2005 system was characterised by unmet demand across 
the system and significant mismatches between supply and 
demand by discipline. Some disciplines such as science were 
                                            
27
 For more detail on the pre-demand driven system, see Norton (2009). 
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over-supplied with places relative to demand, while other 
disciplines – especially in health fields – were chronically 
undersupplied.28  
4.2 How well designed is the demand-driven system? 
The description ‘demand-driven’ implicitly signals a shift from the 
previous ‘supply-driven’ system. It states what the new funding 
system is intended to do. Universities can adjust supply to 
demand in ways they previously could not. But they don’t have to 
respond to student demand – they can reject applicants. In this 
quasi-market, what is produced reflects both supply and demand 
decisions.  
There are reasons why universities might still resist supplying 
what is demanded. Their incentive to supply places is the 
prospect of additional revenue. However if student places are 
under-priced relative to costs, universities will make a loss. In 
these cases, the system could result in a decreased response to 
demand in loss-making disciplines.  
The demand-driven system was introduced without reforming how 
student places are priced. The price universities receive remains 
the same mix as before of fixed Commonwealth contributions (a 
subsidy) and regulated maximum student contributions (which 
students pay, usually using the HELP loan scheme). The 
government rejected a funding review’s suggestions to alter some 
                                            
28
 DEEWR (2008) 
of these prices.29 In the absence of pricing reform, financial 
incentives to supply could be weak or absent. 
While universities are always looking for additional income, 
revenue maximisation is not their core objective. Money is a 
means for other missions. Enrolment can therefore be constrained 
for a variety of reasons. Many universities serve particular local 
communities, and have no interest in setting up new campuses 
elsewhere. They may not want the management complexities that 
come from operating multiple campuses in different local markets. 
The older universities especially are status-driven, which means 
they will not increase enrolments if this means risking prestige. 
For example, the University of New South Wales recently set a 
minimum ATAR of 80 to reinforce its elite brand.30  
These factors can result in universities having as much demand 
as they need to fill their available places. Although they may still 
compete with other universities for particular kinds of students, 
total demand in excess of supply insulates them from market 
forces. They can achieve their mission without taking more 
students. 
The risk of blunted market forces was increased by excluding 
non-university higher education providers (NUHEPs) from the 
demand-driven system. Australia has around 130 NUHEPs.31 
Their exclusion keeps them in the mostly niche markets they have 
traditionally occupied, rather than competing directly with 
universities.  
                                            
29
 Evans (2013) 
30
 Tovey (2013) 
31
 Norton (2013), p. 12-13 
Keep the caps off! Student access and choice in higher education 
Grattan Institute 2013 14 
A ministerial decision to limit sub-bachelor degree undergraduate 
courses created another weakness in the system. Diploma and 
associate degree courses can be good ways of introducing lower-
ATAR students to higher education. The data presented in section 
2.3 suggest that marks are improved if lower-ATAR students enter 
university through a pathway institution rather than directly.  
4.3 Movements in demand and supply 
Although the demand-driven system did not officially start until 
2012, university behaviour changed before then. As enrolment 
caps were eased over the 2008-11 period, many universities 
aggressively sought market share. By 2011, seven universities 
had enrolments of 20 per cent or more above their original target. 
Overall enrolments were 13 per cent above the original target.32 
Enough universities were acting as if enrolment caps were off to 
treat this period as a preview of the demand-driven system.  
Since the demand-driven system was announced in 2009, almost 
all additional demand has been in just three broad disciplinary 
areas: health, science and engineering. Figure 7 shows that the 
other disciplines have stable applicant numbers.  
Concentrated additional demand lets us see whether the demand-
driven system is working as hoped. If it is, offers of places should 
respond to movements in applications. The charts in figure 8 
show that this has happened. In all of health, science and 
engineering, offers and applications both increased significantly 
and together. For all other disciplines offers rose 10 per cent 
                                            
32
 Norton (2011) 
against flat applications. These extra offers reduced previous 
unmet demand.  
Figure 7: Applicant numbers by broad field of education 2009 and 
2013 
 
Sources: DEEWR (2010); DIICCSRTE (2013b) 
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Figure 8: Applications and offers trends: health, science, engineering and other disciplines  
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: DEEWR (2010); DIISRTE (2012); DIICCSRTE (2013b) 
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Increased offers converted into improved offer rates (offers as a 
percentage of first-preference applications). An offer rate of 100 
per cent would mean that every applicant for that field of study 
gets an offer. As figure 9 shows, offer rates improved in most 
disciplines between 2009 and 2012. 33 Science moved from 
excess supply to an even balance between supply and demand.  
Figure 9: Offer rates by discipline, 2009 and 2012 
 
Sources: DEEWR (2010); DIISRTE (2012) 
                                            
33
 2012 data used because 2013 offer rates have not yet been published. 
In three disciplines applicants’ prospects of an offer have not 
improved: medical studies, dentistry, and veterinary studies. For 
medical studies this is unsurprising; it is not in the demand-driven 
system. Dentistry demand increased by about 500 applications 
between 2009 and 2012 but supply remained the same. Demand 
for veterinary studies remained about the same but offers 
decreased by about 100. The effect in both cases was that 
already very low offer rates declined further.  
One explanation is that dentistry and veterinary studies have 
inadequate funding. A Deloitte Access Economics cost study 
found that in most disciplines Commonwealth funding rates were 
sufficient to cover teaching and scholarship costs (that is, 
excluding the cost of research).34 However, for health courses, a 
broad category that includes veterinary studies, the average cost 
per student was above income.  
This is shown in figure 10. The dark line labelled “1” is the 
breakeven point where costs and revenue for a Commonwealth-
supported place are in alignment. In most fields both the mean 
and median costs are below the breakeven point, and so 
universities make a surplus. This explains their willingness to 
supply. In health, median costs are comfortably below the line, 
consistent with large enrolment health fields such as nursing 
having costs that are below funding rates. However, mean health 
course costs are above the line, consistent with some expensive 
courses pushing up the average. University interest groups 
invariably claim that they are under-funded, but veterinary and 
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dentistry school representatives provided a 2011 funding review 
with unusually detailed evidence in their cases.35 
Figure 10: Mean and median teaching and scholarship costs, 2010 
 
Source: Deloitte Access Economics (2011) 
4.4 Match at first-preference course level 
Overall, the demand-driven system is improving matches between 
students and their first preference field of education. However, 
first preference course matches have improved only slightly. The 
first-preference offer rate increased from 52 per cent in 2009 to 54 
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 ACODS (2011); Veterinary Deans (2011) 
per cent in 2012.36 This probably reflects large numbers of people 
rejected by ‘elite’ institutions receiving offers in a matching course 
by another university. This would be consistent with elite 
institutions constraining supply to maintain their status (section 
4.2). University status-maximisation strategies such as the UNSW 
minimum ATAR policy may limit improvement on this indicator. 
We do not know how often missing out on a first preference 
course is very disappointing for applicants. One survey of Year 12 
students explored the issue of course versus university. Nearly 
two-thirds of respondents indicated that a combination of 
university and course considerations drove their choice. Among 
those driven by one or the other, 5 per cent nominated the 
university, and 31 per cent nominated the course.37 However, 
some applicants may regard two or more universities as close 
substitutes. 
In a 2011 survey of graduates three years after completion, 63 per 
cent said that if they had the choice today they were very or 
extremely likely to do the same qualification at the same 
institution. By comparison, 22 per cent of respondents said they 
would be very or extremely likely to choose the same qualification 
at a different institution.38 These hindsight preferences may be 
different from the respondents’ original university preferences. 
They suggest that most people are happy with the institution they 
attend, but a significant minority are not.  
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 DEEWR (2009b), p. 26; DIISRTE (2012), p. 20-21 
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 Roy Morgan Research (2009), p. 101 
38
 Beyond Graduation Survey 2011. SPSS datafile supplied to Grattan by 
Graduate Careers Australia.  
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Overall, a match at field of education is probably more important. 
Field of study is more relevant to employment prospects than 
university attended.39 On this measure, the demand-driven 
system is likely to continue improving student matches, as 
universities adjust their historical allocations of student places to 
the new market conditions.   
                                            
39
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5. Encouraging innovation
Australian universities often seem like conservative places. But in 
practice they respond energetically to entrepreneurial 
opportunities. It happened with international students and 
postgraduate coursework students. It is happening again with the 
demand-driven system.  
As section 4.3 explains, when supply constraints were lifted on 
Commonwealth-supported places (CSPs) universities moved 
quickly to better match it with existing demand. We are also 
seeing new ventures and services enter the market.  
Swinburne University has a joint venture with SEEK Ltd, 
Swinburne Online, which started in 2012. In a recent paper, Sean 
Gallagher and Geoffrey Garrett describe its operation which has 
expanded to 7,000 students by the second year of operation: 
Learning is “entirely digital” where students are arranged in 
online cohorts of 25, facilitated by an e-Learning Advisor (eLA) 
and connected through blogs, email and learning management 
systems. The eLA is specifically trained … and must first pass 
induction and training in “e-moderation” and facilitation of 
online learning cohorts.
40
 
 
Swinburne could not have created Swinburne Online under the 
old system of Commonwealth-supported places allocated by 
government. They would have needed to go through a slow 
                                            
40
 Gallagher and Garrett (2013), p. 44 
political process to get new places, with no recent precedent for 
such a large number of new students at a single institution. 
Bureaucrats and politicians would have agonised over a joint 
venture with a for-profit company. Redistributing large numbers of 
places from within Swinburne’s pre-2012 allocation would also 
have been politically difficult. Staff and student constituencies 
would (understandably) have resisted undermining viable courses 
for a venture that may not succeed. As it has turned out, 
Swinburne Online offers an innovative form of online education, 
for which there is strong market demand.  
Across the other side of the country, Curtin University launched 
Curtin Online in 2011, extending its existing courses that were 
available online. In 2012, Curtin had 6,800 off-campus students, a 
70 per cent increase on the 2010 pre-launch year.41  
Open Universities Australia (OUA) flourished in the online 
education market before the demand-driven system. It sells 
subjects offered by its shareholder universities and other higher 
education providers. There are no Commonwealth contributions 
for subjects outside of a degree program, and OUA’s growth was 
unconstrained. But the demand-driven system allowed its client 
universities to offer subsidised degree programs through OUA. 
Overall, OUA experienced a 7 per cent growth rate between 2011 
and 2012.42 
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 DIICCSRTE (2013d) and the 2010 predecessor publication.  
42
 Ibid. 
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Fortunately the demand-driven system’s launch coincided with the 
global trend towards online education. Without this policy shift, 
Australian universities may have continued on their path of slow 
growth in online education.43 With it, Australian universities can 
meet the shifting demand for online education and experiment 
with new business models.  
As noted in section 4.2, non-university higher education providers 
(NUHEPs) are excluded from the demand-driven system. This is 
an obvious and major obstacle to higher education innovation. 
Despite this exclusion, the uncapping of student places has led to 
franchising models of provision. For example, the University of 
Canberra (UC) is franchising its degrees through four TAFEs. The 
degrees will be jointly developed by the TAFEs and UC, but the 
students would enrol in UC and get UC degrees. The CEO of one 
TAFE stressed that the programs had to be different from those 
currently offered by universities. He said that they had to attract 
the students currently “marginalised’ from higher education.44  
Putting caps back on Commonwealth-supported places would 
discourage innovation in the CSP market. As happened in the 
1990s and early 2000s, the energy of university management 
would be directed to where it could make a difference: in 
international students, in postgraduate coursework, and in 
research.  
The financial costs of lifting enrolment caps are real, and 
discussed in detail in the next chapter. But there are many hidden 
costs in capping the system. The caps misallocate resources 
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 Norton, et al. (2013), p. 16 
44
 Ross (2013) 
between disciplines, and between old and new ways of doing 
things. Leaving them off is critical to a dynamic higher education 
industry.  
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6. The cost of the demand-driven system
A demand-driven system was inevitably going to cost taxpayers 
more than its predecessor systems. Australia had unmet higher 
education demand waiting to be satisfied, and uncapping gave 
higher education providers the opportunity to find new markets. 
The result has been significantly higher expenditure, compared 
not only to the past but also to original budget forecasts.  
As the Commonwealth Government’s budget deteriorated, higher 
education received particular attention. The demand-driven 
system itself is so far intact, but previously promised per student 
funding levels are going to be reduced.45 In response to university 
lobbying on funding, the higher education minister, Senator Kim 
Carr, said that he would only consider budget-neutral changes to 
original cuts.46 Universities wanting to suggest alternative cuts has 
called the demand-driven system into question.  
Figure 11 shows just how radical the higher education policies of 
recent years have been. After 15 years of stability or slow growth, 
Commonwealth-supported student numbers started growing 
rapidly in 2009. The government predicts that the system will 
continue expanding until at least 2017, although at a slower rate. 
Much of the previously existing unmet demand has been met, and 
the school leaver population is expected to decline slightly.47 
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 The cuts have not been legislated, but the Opposition supports them.  
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 Shanahan (2013) 
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 ABS (2012) 
Figure 11: Commonwealth supported full-time equivalent students, 
1989-2017 (estimates 2013-17) 
 
Source: Data provided by DIICCSRTE 
Unsurprisingly these additional students are driving up 
expenditure on the Commonwealth Grant Scheme (CGS), the 
core tuition subsidy program. Figure 12 shows the CGS forecasts 
for each Commonwealth Budget between 2009 and 2013. Future 
expenditure was significantly under-estimated in the early years. 
The government did not predict that so many universities would 
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‘jump the gun’ on the demand-driven system (section 4.3). They 
may also not have foreseen growth concentrated in health, 
engineering and science. These disciplines have high per student 
government subsidies.48 The cumulative effect of more students in 
more expensive disciplines is that government spending will 
continue to increase, despite the cuts announced in April 2013. 
The cuts save less than $300 million a year.49 Effectively, the cuts 
take the demand-driven system back onto the spending trajectory 
it was on in 2011.  
Figure 12: Commonwealth Grant Scheme budget forecasts, 2009-13 
 
Source: DIICCSRTE (2013c) and predecessor publications. 
                                            
48
 The rates are reported in Norton (2013), p. 52 
49
 Swan and Wong (2013), p. 217 
The demand-driven system also pushes up costs in two other 
government programs, the Higher Education Loan Program 
(HELP) and student income support. Even after the 2013 cuts, 
expenditure on the demand-driven system is expected to increase 
by nearly 45 per cent over eight years. By 2017, it will cost 
taxpayers more than $11 billion per year.  
Figure 13: Demand-driven system costs, 2009-10 to 2016-17 
 
Source: DIICCSRTE (2013c) and predecessor publications 
Note: Youth Allowance and Austudy expenditure is based on higher education share of 
Youth Allowance and Austudy recipients.  
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7. Controlling costs in the demand-driven system
Several options have been proposed for containing public higher 
education expenditure: cutting per student spending, setting a 
minimum ATAR, and re-capping the system. However, all of these 
have consequences that are inefficient, unfair or both. A fourth 
option is to increase student contributions to cover reductions in 
Commonwealth spending.  
7.1 The government’s plan – cutting per student spending 
The government’s plans to curb higher education costs were 
announced in April 2013.50 It tackled costs across the spending 
drivers: the conversion of some student income support from 
grants to loans, the abolition of some HELP concessions, and an 
“efficiency dividend” on grants under the Higher Education 
Support Act 2003 (HESA). The biggest program under HESA is 
the Commonwealth Grant Scheme (CGS), which as chapter 6 
showed is headed towards $7.2 billion expenditure a year. The 
government plans to take 2 per cent off the CGS in 2014, and 
1.25 per cent in 2015. Effectively, it is taking away some 
previously promised increases in Commonwealth contributions, 
through a more generous indexation system. The budget forward 
estimates suggest that this will save $228 million in 2014-15 rising 
to $300 million in 2016-17.51 
These cuts are not especially large as a proportion of total 
university revenues. Even for Commonwealth-supported students, 
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51
 Swan and Wong (2013), p. 217 
student contributions make up 40 per cent of university income. 
This income stream will continue to increase under the normal 
indexation system. However, the cuts are inconvenient. 
Universities are currently re-negotiating enterprise agreements, 
and under pressure to deliver above-inflation pay increases. Cuts 
to Commonwealth contributions would increase the likelihood of 
staff redundancies and cancellation or postponement of 
investment in buildings and equipment. These flow-on effects may 
compromise the quality of the student learning experience. 
7.2 Setting a minimum ATAR 
The Group of Eight has suggested a minimum ATAR of 60 
generally and 70 for teacher education courses.52 This rule would 
have saved up to $130 million in Commonwealth contributions if it 
had been in place for 2013.53 Savings would increase in 
subsequent years, due to smaller second and third year student 
cohorts. It would also curb growth in an area of the higher 
education market where there is still large potential demand.  
Setting a minimum ATAR is not straightforward. The 
Commonwealth Government does not directly regulate who is 
admitted to university. It can influence admission decisions only 
indirectly, through general requirements about how 
Commonwealth funds are used. The one current rule is that 
higher education providers must have “open, fair and transparent” 
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selection procedures, which are based on “merit” in the provider’s 
“reasonable view”.54 On the analysis in chapter 2, this provision 
provides no basis for a minimum ATAR.  
While the Commonwealth Government does not decide who is 
admitted to university, it can deem some students ineligible for 
Commonwealth support. This means that the university would not 
receive a Commonwealth contribution for those students and the 
students would not be entitled to a HECS-HELP loan.  
The legal process for restricting Commonwealth support to low 
ATAR students is cumbersome. The Minister needs to determine 
that “students of a specified kind” – that is, students with ATARs 
below 60 – may not be enrolled as Commonwealth-supported 
students. The legislation requires that the Minister consider the 
effects of the determination on students.55 Chapter 2 shows that 
the effect would be that many low ATAR applicants who could get 
a degree would be excluded.  
The determination needs to be made at least six months before 
students are next able to start the specified courses.56 This leaves 
only a few weeks left to make the determination if is to influence 
the major student intake in late February/early March 2014.  
Even if made soon, the determination would face additional legal 
obstacles. It would be a “legislative instrument”, which either 
house of parliament can disallow.57 Given its apparent unfairness, 
disallowance would be a real prospect in the Senate at least. As 
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 Higher Education Support Act 2003, (HESA 2003), section 19-35 
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 HESA 2003, section 36-15 
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 HESA 2003, section 36-15(4) 
57
 Legislative Instruments Act 2003, section 42 
the 2013 federal election means the loss of the spring 
parliamentary sitting days, the determination may be disallowed 
very late in the year. This would restore the right of low-ATAR 
students to a Commonwealth-supported place.  
A new minimum ATAR rule a few months before the 2014 intake 
would cause chaos for students and universities. If it is to be 
feasible, it would have to be for 2015 or later, as the Group of 
Eight proposed. It therefore cannot be used to save money in 
2014.  
7.3 Re-capping the system 
The minimum ATAR option is unlikely to gain traction. It is legally 
complex, and requires the Commonwealth to take responsibility 
for an arbitrary cut-off. The easier option is to control costs by re-
capping expenditure on Commonwealth-supported places 
(CSPs). In the apparent deal being considered by the Higher 
Education Minister, the savings from fewer CSP students would 
offset the planned $300 million cuts.  
The only existing legal mechanism for doing this is the funding 
agreement each university has to sign with the Commonwealth 
Government. To meet the proposed savings, the funding 
agreements would need to take about 20,000 student places out 
of the system in 2014-15, and about 25,000 places in each of 
2014-15 and 2015-16.58 The precise number could vary 
significantly depending on discipline. Commonwealth 
contributions for 2014 range from less than $2,000 per student 
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place to more than $21,000. The funding agreements for 2014 
have not been signed, so this option is more legally feasible than 
setting a minimum ATAR. Funding agreements must be 
published, but they are not legislative instruments.59 
The funding agreements cover two types of CSP. In the first 
category are the already capped places in medicine, along with 
capped numbers of postgraduate coursework and sub-bachelor 
undergraduate places. Legally these could be cut, within a 
constraint of current students enrolled on a CSP basis having a 
legal entitlement to continued Commonwealth support.60 If CSPs 
were cut, at public universities postgraduate but not 
undergraduate students could enrol on a full-fee basis instead.61 
They would be entitled to a FEE-HELP loan to help them pay the 
fees.62  
The government would have to make significant cuts to the 
controlled CSP places. In 2012, there were 35,000 postgraduate 
coursework places and 9,000 sub-bachelor places.63 There is also 
a risk that displacement back into the demand-driven system 
would reduce financial savings. Universities may encourage 
diploma and associate degree students to take bachelor degrees 
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 Public universities must enrol domestic undergraduates on a CSP basis: 
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 DIICCSRTE (2013e) 
instead. The various initial professional entry masters courses 
could be re-classified as undergraduate.  
Capping CSPs in the demand-driven system is complicated. The 
funding agreements cannot mandate lower total Commonwealth 
contributions on these CSPs than the year before.64 So this 
provision can curb growth, but not reduce spending. Current 
forecast growth between 2013 and 2014 is 21,500 places (see 
figure 11, page 21). So it is a borderline case as to whether the 
funding agreements can deliver offset savings. In any case, it 
would require a general freeze in places and the effective end of 
the demand-driven system. The gains described in chapters 3 to 5 
would be lost.  
Cutting student numbers may also have long-term consequences 
for Commonwealth Government tax revenues through fewer 
graduates. A future paper from Grattan may explore this issue 
using a revised version of the higher education financial benefits 
analysis used in the 2012 publication Graduate Winners: 
Assessing the public and private benefits of higher education. 
7.4 Increase student contributions  
In the odd politics of the higher education sector, the simplest 
solution to decreased public funding has barely been mentioned: 
increase student contributions. University vice-chancellors are 
ideologically divided on the broader issue of increasing student 
contributions, and fee advocates have gone quiet.  
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But increased student contributions in this case should not cause 
major difficulties. An approximate six per cent increase in student 
contributions would offset the $300 million cuts to Commonwealth 
funding. A routine three per cent increase in student contributions 
for 2014 was recently revealed on the DIICCSRTE website 
without comment or controversy.65 Universities decide on student 
contributions, so they would also be free to charge less if they 
could find genuine efficiencies for their ‘efficiency dividend’. 
As with all student contributions, students could borrow this under 
the HECS-HELP scheme, and repay it from their future income. 
With this income-contingent loan there is unlikely to be much 
reduction in demand.66 
Neither vice-chancellors nor politicians relish imposing costs on 
students. But students will pay for these funding cuts anyway in 
student contributions, reduced services, or a less responsive 
higher education system. The policy question we face is not 
whether students will pay. It is which policy option delivers a 
financial saving at least loss of fairness and efficiency.   
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8. Conclusion: keep the demand-driven system
Demand-driven university funding is a policy that is clearly 
achieving its goals.  
Universities are responding to student demand. Additional student 
places have been created where demand has increased: in 
health, engineering and science. Increased offers in other fields 
are soaking up previous unmet demand. Student choices of what 
they want to study are more likely to be met than before. In a 
couple of areas, universities have not responded to student 
demand. But this reflects per student funding issues that require a 
policy adjustment, not a policy reversal. 
Although some university leaders would like the government to 
again control student numbers, there has been no explanation of 
how student places would be allocated efficiently. History 
suggests that the government does a poor job distributing student 
places between fields of study. Under the old system, some fields 
were chronically under-supplied with student places while others 
were chronically over-supplied. Under the demand-driven system, 
we are moving towards a more even balance between supply and 
demand.  
Under the old system, there was a striking contrast between the 
dynamism universities displayed in international student markets 
and the stagnation shown in the regulated market for 
Commonwealth-supported students. With the lifting of controls we 
are seeing new initiatives for Commonwealth-supported students, 
including collaborations with the corporate sector and with TAFEs.  
Under a centrally-managed system, change is just too slow and 
too politically difficult to produce the best results.  
An uncapped higher education system is creating new 
opportunities for people from disadvantaged backgrounds. Their 
numbers have grown quickly after years of stability. Proposals to 
set a minimum ATAR would be a major setback for the equity 
agenda. But any recapping of student places would 
disproportionally hit low SES applicants. It would mean higher 
ATARs across the system.  
The proposed minimum ATAR of 60 does not representing a clear 
dividing line between likely academic success and likely academic 
failure. Most students (over half) who enter on ATARs below 60 
eventually complete a qualification. Admission cut-offs need to 
stay local, using information about specific courses and 
applicants.  
The Commonwealth Government’s financial problems are real, 
and higher education cannot expect to be exempt from savings 
measures. But recapping student places is the worst of all 
possible savings measures. Universities just wearing the cuts or 
increasing student contributions would both be better options.  
The demand-driven system could turn out to be like income-
contingent loans: an Australian policy experiment from which the 
rest of the world can learn. We should keep it.  
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9. Glossary
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ATAR Australian Tertiary Admission Rank.  
ATAR ranks students in their age 
group according to their school 
results, with lower numbers indicating 
lower ranks. 
CGS Commonwealth Grant Scheme 
Commonwealth contribution The Federal Government’s tuition 
subsidy 
DEEWR Department of Education, 
Employment and Workplace 
Relations 
DIICCSRTE Department of Industry, Innovation, 
Climate Change, Science, Research 
and Tertiary Education  
EFTSL Equivalent full-time student load 
FEE-HELP HELP for full-fee students 
FTE Full-time equivalent 
Field of study A disciplinary area, such as health or 
engineering   
GCA Graduate Careers Australia 
Group of Eight Coalition of Australia’s ‘sandstone’  
universities 
HECS Higher Education Contribution  
HECS-HELP HELP for Commonwealth-
supported students 
HELP Higher Education Loan Program 
HESA Higher Education Support Act 2003 
NUHEP Non-university higher education 
provider 
OUA Open Universities Australia 
Pathway college Institution specialising in diploma 
level courses aimed at facilitating 
entry to university courses 
SES Socio-economic status 
Student contribution  The amount paid by a student in a 
Commonwealth-supported place 
TAFE Technical and further education 
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